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Introduction 5 
This research examines the roles of 23 professionals facilitating cross border reproduction, as 6 
part of a broader socio-legal study of the Australian experience of cross border assisted 7 
reproduction. We sought to understand how facilitators and service providers operate within 8 
a professional frame, examining their understandings of ethical limits on their roles within a 9 
largely unregulated and rapidly evolving international ‘marketplace’. 10 
Those who facilitate travel across international borders to pursue assisted reproduction are 11 
little understood (Inhorn and Gurtin, 2011, 668). Within the broader field of study of medical 12 
travel, most empirical studies have addressed facilitator websites (Cormany and Baloglu, 13 
2011;  Lee et al., 2014; Lunt and Carrera, 2011; Maguire et al., 2016; Mason and Wright, 2011; 14 
Penney et al., 2011; Sobo et al., 2011; Turner, 2012) or other promotional materials such as 15 
brochures (Crooks et al., 2011). A handful of studies have surveyed medical travel facilitator 16 
companies (Alleman et al., 2011; Peters and Sauer, 2011) or interviewed facilitators (Chee et 17 
al., 2017; Dalstrom, 2013; Holliday and Bell, 2015; Johnston et al., 2011; Lunt et al., 2014b, 18 
2014a; Snyder et al., 2011; Speier, 2015, 2011). Perhaps unsurprisingly, researchers have 19 
found that facilitator companies emphasised the benefits of medical travel rather than the 20 
risks (Lee et al., 2014; Mason and Wright, 2011; Penney et al., 2011) and reported that 21 
facilitators did not consistently provide information about legal liability, regulatory oversight, 22 
emergency arrangements, or financial ties (Lunt and Carrera, 2011; Maguire et al., 2016). In 23 
general, researchers have analysed medical travel facilitators as businesses, often 24 
characterising them as a sub-set of tourism or mode of travel agency, or alternately analysing 25 
their operations as part of a system of information flow, and more recently with increasing 26 
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complexity, as dynamic networks (Lunt et al., 2014; Hanefeld et al., 2015) and international 27 
‘assemblages’ (Chee et al., 2017).  28 
In the smaller field of empirical research on facilitators and providers of internationalised 29 
assisted reproduction, feminist-oriented researchers have paid heightened attention to the 30 
relationships between providers and travellers. In foundational research on the facilitation of 31 
egg donation in the Czech Republic and Thailand, Amy Speier and Andrea Whittaker 32 
characterised the role of facilitators as one of ‘intimate labour’ (Whittaker and Speier, 2010; 33 
Speier, 2015; a characterisation echoed in Holliday and Bell’s more recent analysis of those 34 
facilitating cosmetic surgery travel: 2015) in which small operations, run by those who are 35 
former patients themselves, provide both logistical and emotional support as an explicit 36 
dimension of their services. In the context of international surrogacy in India, Prabha 37 
Kotiswaran utilises the concept of ‘relational work’ drawn from economic sociology to 38 
characterise the role of doctors in clinics she observed negotiating the roles, emotions and 39 
expectations of intended parents and surrogates, and actively crafting meaning within those 40 
relationships (2013, 134). 41 
Amy Speier states that, ‘Intimate labour offers a way to understand how care, kinship work 42 
and economic transactions must be considered in tandem’ (Speier, 2015, 27) and Whittaker 43 
and Speier have noted in their work that IVF brokers ‘assert the primacy of affective 44 
relationships in their trade’ (2010, 364). All of the professionals interviewed in the present 45 
research, to a greater or lesser degree, characterised their role as one of relational or intimate 46 
labour, overtly claiming the value of nurture and care in the provision of their services, and 47 
downplaying the commercial nature of the transaction or of their own motives.  48 
 49 
Building on a feminist relational approach, rather than examining facilitators of fertility travel 50 
as a form of business or web-based marketplace, we sought to understand their roles within 51 
this frame of relational labour. This frame immediately prompts questions about to whom the 52 
facilitator owes allegiance or professional duties, most especially when the interests and 53 
needs of the relevant parties – patients seeking surrogacy or egg donation, reproductive 54 
contributors or ‘assistors’ providing eggs or surrogacy (Inhorn and Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2008), 55 
other professionals providing elements of the service ‘assemblage’ (Chee et al., 2017) – are 56 
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in actual or potential conflict. Thus, this analysis seeks to understand the operations of those 57 
facilitating or providing cross border reproductive services as a form of professional practice 58 
based within a web of commercial and personal relationships that form relational labour. We 59 
found that informal practice-based norms dominate current understandings of ethical 60 
conduct. These norms are largely implicit, and there appears to be little appetite to make 61 
them express, formal or binding; although it is suggested that there was some common 62 
ground among the interview cohort in terms of shared understandings of minimum standards 63 
of good practice. 64 
Background 65 
Relative to other Western Countries, IVF in Australia is liberal in access and somewhat 66 
affordable, with no limits on the number of cycles or age of women undertaking treatment, 67 
and substantial (although declining) public subsidies for treatment (Karpin and Millbank, 68 
2014). However, surrogacy is highly regulated, with variable rules in different states for 69 
eligibility and approval processes, and strict post-birth consent based parentage transfer laws 70 
styled on the UK, which require court approval. Throughout Australia there are long-standing 71 
shortages of donor gametes; with long waiting lists for donor eggs, and much donor sperm 72 
obtained through importation (Millbank, 2015b). Both gamete donation and surrogacy take 73 
place within an overt framework of ‘altruism’ in which any payment beyond documented 74 
reasonable expenses is prohibited, and professional matching and intermediation is also 75 
prohibited (Karpin and Millbank, 2014).   76 
Australian women travel abroad to undertake egg donation not because of ‘push’ factors such 77 
as legal restrictions, but rather due to the ‘pull’ of ‘bioavailability’ (Cohen, 2005): that is, to 78 
access donor eggs more quickly, and with a wider range of choice, than they are able to within 79 
Australia (Rodino et al., 2014, 1425; Millbank, 2015b). Common destinations for Australians 80 
seeking egg donation at the time of writing are South Africa, Greece, Spain and the USA.  81 
Australian women and men who travel overseas to undertake surrogacy do so for a range of 82 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ reasons including:  local legislative barriers to access in some states (such as 83 
the exclusion of gay men from regulated surrogacy in some states), perceptions of 84 
unavailability or complexity of domestic surrogacy, the desire to access professional 85 
intermediation and matching services, the desire for (the appearance of) legal certainty 86 
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around parentage and surrogacy obligations, and the belief that overseas providers are 87 
successful and accessible (Everingham et al., 2014; Rodino et al., 2014, 1425, 1426; Jackson 88 
et al., 2017). When gay men undertake surrogacy, or when a female intended parent is unable 89 
to contribute her own eggs, overseas surrogacy arrangements also include the use of egg 90 
donation services. Common destinations for Australians in the 2000s seeking surrogacy were 91 
India and Thailand; following regulatory crack-downs operators migrated across to Nepal and 92 
Cambodia, respectively, as well as Mexico, before these jurisdictions, too, were shut down 93 
(Jackson et al., 2017, 24; Everingham et al., 2014). Canada, the USA, Ukraine and Kenya 94 
remain common destinations at the time of writing. 95 
 96 
Methods and materials 97 
The broader study examined the experiences of Australians who travel, both internationally 98 
and within Australia, to undertake assisted reproduction. Semi-structured interviews took 99 
place between June 2015 and June 2018 with a total of 93 interviews conducted. Interviews 100 
were transcribed, anonymised, and entered into NVivo software to enable thematic coding 101 
and analysis. 102 
 103 
The total cohort comprised 66 interviews with patientsi and 27 with professionals. Among the 104 
patient group were 37 interviews with people who had travelled overseas. Countries travelled 105 
to were: India, Thailand, Nepal, Mexico, Spain, South Africa, Greece, Canada, and the USA. 106 
Ten participants travelled to more than one country in different attempts. Several 107 
participants also undertook treatment with more than one provider in a given country in 108 
subsequent pregnancy attempts. Twenty patient interviews involved participants who had 109 
undertaken one or more surrogacy arrangements overseas (seven gay men, twelve women 110 
and one man and woman interviewed as a couple). Seventeen interviewees involved patients 111 
who travelled to undertake egg or embryo donation in order to try to achieve a pregnancy 112 
themselves (16 women and one man and woman interviewed as a couple). Among 113 
interviewees, 30 had children born as a result of CBRCii and a further four participants were 114 
pregnant at the time of interview.   115 
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Among the professional cohort were four professionals who only worked facilitating 116 
treatment within Australia. Thus there were 23 interviews conducted with professionals 117 
involved in CBRC; 12 by telephone and 11 in person. Interviews were semi-structured and 118 
took between 40 and 90 minutes. Recruitment was targeted at services named by patient 119 
interviewees in the study, as well as by members of on-line message boards examined in the 120 
study, as those which they or others known to them had utilised. A number of other providers 121 
were identified through their placement of advertising or sponsorship, or personal 122 
appearance, at fertility ‘roadshows’ (Jackson et al., 2017) held within Australia and directed 123 
primarily to Australian clients. Those services were also approached via email and, in a small 124 
number of cases, in person at the relevant events. No provider declined to participate, but 125 
four providers did not respond to requests.  This targeted recruitment process reflected the 126 
aim of the study which was to identify services utilised by Australians and, indeed, most 127 
services reported a substantial proportion of Australian clientele.  128 
Among the 23 professionals interviewed there were 11 women and 12 men. Eight were based 129 
within Australia, while the rest were located in the USA (6), the UK, Canada and Greece (2 130 
each), and Thailand, South Africa and Israel (1 each). Interviewees reported that they had 131 
been in practice in their current occupation for between 1 and 20+ years, with an average of 132 
12 years and a median practice duration of 9 years. Interviewees located abroad estimated 133 
that between 20 per cent to 80 per cent of their international clientele were Australian. The 134 
interviewees are grouped into three categories in this analysis: medical professionals, lawyers 135 
and facilitators. However, as will be seen there was some overlap in the roles performed 136 
between the legal and facilitator groups, as well as considerable variation in the roles 137 
performed within those groupings. In semi-structured interviews, providers’ views were 138 
sought on what they ‘value add’ to their clients’ experience, how conflicts of interest arise, 139 
whether they reject clients, their views on unethical or improper practice and what role, if 140 
any, regulation should play in improving or safeguarding their field from unscrupulous 141 
players, particularly in the trans-national context.  142 
The major limitation of our methodology lies in the self-selecting nature of those who 143 
participated, in that they typically saw themselves as ‘good’ market players, and they had a 144 
strong interest in showing a positive face of their operation to Australian researchers. In 145 
addition, the dynamic and fast changing marketplace in cross border reproductive care (CBRC) 146 
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means that an overview of any operation or operator is very much a point in time snapshot. 147 
Moreover, it was not always clear if particular operators had commercial links with other 148 
providers or facilitators, such that purportedly distinct or arm-length arrangements could in 149 
fact be covertly enmeshed. Finally, the tightly knit networks of players and markets meant 150 
that interviewees were markedly reluctant to specify other providers whom they believed 151 
were operating unethically, possibly because such information might come back to harm their 152 
own business.  153 
This next section outlines the main characteristics of, and divisions between, the professional 154 
groups. The major focus of this piece is upon those who fall outside the bounds of traditional 155 
professional disciplines (such as medicine and law) and whose ethical frame and sense of 156 
professional obligation is therefore less externally imposed and, I suggest, more individually 157 
shaped through their experience and practise.   158 
I. Professional groups and characteristics 159 
Four of the interviewees were medical professionals providing IVF services, all of whom were 160 
male. Their role in generating cross border reproduction was largely through marketing their 161 
expertise in egg donation and/or surrogacy to Australian clients (often directly, e.g. through 162 
participating in webinars or travelling fertility ‘roadshows’), drawing upon their experience, 163 
success rates, professional standing, personal charisma and access to a ready supply of 164 
reproductive contributors as ‘pull’ factors. The medical practitioners understood themselves 165 
to be a distinct profession in which their role was to ‘treat patients’, whether domestic or 166 
international, rather than as a source of egg donation or surrogacy services per se. However, 167 
two of the doctors’ medical practices directly recruited egg donors, and one directly recruited 168 
surrogates; the remainder dealt with surrogates or egg donors via one or more agencies that 169 
they worked with regularly. Two of the doctors had originally trained and worked in Australia, 170 
and all of them reported strong professional links and referral channels with Australian 171 
medical professionals. 172 
Eleven interviewees were lawyers, of whom five were women. The services that they 173 
provided, and their conception of their role, varied widely. Five fit squarely within the 174 
commonly understood role of an independent legal professional; that is, they operated 175 
specialist practices providing legal advice on contracts, parentage and immigration issues for 176 
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clients who had engaged with a wide range of agencies and countries in undertaking 177 
surrogacy. However, for more than half of the lawyers their roles were far less clear. Two 178 
lawyers worked directly and exclusively for surrogacy or CBRC agencies as in-house counsel 179 
or as a one-step removed ‘independent’ lawyer working in a close association with the 180 
agency. Two lawyers owned and managed major surrogacy agencies (and related egg 181 
donation agencies) and also maintained related legal practices, and two other lawyers had an 182 
independent specialist legal practice plus a smaller side-business facilitating CBRC and/or 183 
surrogacy arrangements. All of the lawyers understood their legal role as jurisdictionally 184 
bounded; that is, they gave advice only on the law of their jurisdiction of practice. Because of 185 
the dual or multiple nature of legal regimes operative in CBRC this meant that it was common 186 
for lawyers to report that they repeatedly paired up with, and cross-referred to, other lawyers 187 
in relevant jurisdictions. 188 
The remaining eight interviewees could broadly be characterised as ‘agents’ facilitating CBRC. 189 
Six of these interviewees were women who were directly involved in brokering arrangements 190 
between reproductive contributors and recipients, while the two men undertook more 191 
removed facilitation work through organising referral pathways. Of the men, Travis worked 192 
exclusively for a single foreign entity, channelling clientele to them as a direct agent located 193 
in Australia being paid a form of commission, while Alec’s role was as an information clearing 194 
house, funded mostly by CBRC providers, marketing surrogacy and associated egg donation 195 
services to Australians and also providing specific advice services to intended parents. Neither 196 
man was himself involved directly in facilitating the individual arrangements that ensued.  197 
In contrast, the six female facilitators provided or matched egg donors and/or surrogates with 198 
patients and intended parents as hands-on brokers of reproductive arrangements.  These six 199 
women all ran their own businesses, mostly as sole start-ups that had grown to a cottage 200 
industry or small business incorporated as a private company with between four and six 201 
employees. In contrast the largest professional agency in the study was a major surrogacy 202 
provider with more than a dozen full time employees.  203 
Notably, matching or brokering work also encompassed a variety of direct and supply chain 204 
conduct: some interviewees ran agencies in which they recruited, screened and selected egg 205 
donors and/or surrogates, while others recruited, screened and selected surrogates but drew 206 
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upon another agency or agencies to provide donor eggs. Even among surrogacy agents there 207 
were very different levels of service provided, reflecting both commercial scale and 208 
jurisdictional legal restraints. For example, Robyn ran a large US-based surrogacy agency 209 
which provided very extensive screening and direct matching services; in contrast to Ruth’s 210 
small home-based surrogacy agency in Canada where it was unlawful to be paid a fee to 211 
directly match parents and surrogates and she instead ran a closed website where previously 212 
screened parties self-matched and then were provided with support services. Both large and 213 
small agencies offered a variety of other practical support to patients beyond the 214 
reproductive arrangement, often providing a range of ‘concierge’ services such as arranging 215 
travel and accommodation and referring or linking clients with local IVF providers and lawyers 216 
in order to facilitate treatment, legal parentage and travel documentation. Significantly, a 217 
range of such services was also provided to reproductive contributors, including assistance in 218 
travelling to medical appointments, taking injections, peer support groups and counselling. 219 
The facilitators came from diverse professional and educational backgrounds. Two facilitators 220 
had some training in counselling or social work, without having attained a formal tertiary 221 
qualification, while others had trained in and previously worked in teaching, accounting, 222 
embryology and health research.  223 
A striking commonality among the eight heterogeneous facilitators was that all volunteered 224 
that they had personal experience of assisted reproduction, both as patients and as 225 
reproductive contributors. This reflects other qualitative research in the field which has found 226 
that facilitators are frequently former patients whose business models and professional 227 
practices were strongly informed by their own experiences and connections overseas (e.g. 228 
Speier, 2015; Lunt et al., 2015; Holliday and Bell, 2015; see also Alleman et al., 2011). In our 229 
study, three interviewees had children as intended parents through surrogacy prior to 230 
becoming surrogacy facilitators; two facilitators volunteered that they had come into the field 231 
having previously experienced infertility, two interviewees were repeat egg donors prior to 232 
founding egg donation agencies (one had also recently been a surrogate) and one was a 233 
former surrogate before founding her own surrogacy agency. In contrast only two of the 11 234 
lawyers were parents through surrogacy, and none among the medical or legal group 235 
volunteered that they had been reproductive contributors.  236 
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Unlike doctors and lawyers, the heterogeneous facilitator group did not have a shared 237 
training, discipline or professional membership to constrain their conduct or shape their 238 
ethical decision making.  The unifying factor for the facilitator group was that they had created 239 
their business through experience, and had an embodied claim to expertise, this strongly 240 
informed their understanding of their collective identity as ‘lay experts’ (Speier, 2011, 595) 241 
and of ethical standards. For this reason, the facilitator group is the major focus of this paper 242 
but I also pay heightened attention to the ‘hybrid lawyers’ who owned agencies or performed 243 
faciliatory roles in addition to their legal role, because of the ambiguous professional and 244 
ethical boundaries that this engendered. 245 
II. What is the role of the facilitator, and what value do they provide 246 
Krawiec suggests that in third party assisted reproduction generally, most intended parents, 247 
surrogates, and gamete donors are in need of some form of professional intermediation 248 
because they are ‘not repeat players’ and as such they interact with ‘severe information 249 
disparities’ (Krawiec, 2009, 236). Elsewhere, I and others have argued that high quality 250 
professional intermediaries may be helpful in third party assisted reproduction, for instance 251 
if they assist in negotiating expectations, matching personalities and needs, providing 252 
information, support and counselling, or monitoring and ensuring quality (Krawiec, 2009, 234; 253 
Millbank, 2015a).  254 
Analysing the ways in which facilitators spoke of what they do, and how this is of value to 255 
their clientele, revealed a number of themes: specialist knowledge, quality control, and 256 
support services. Within all of these, but most especially in the area of ‘support’, was the 257 
claim that the agent provided something unique and valuable to the client, unavailable from 258 
other providers and necessary to a positive experience and/or outcome. While the specialist 259 
knowledge claims were framed as forms of expertise, the quality control and support claims 260 
were much more deeply imbued with the language of intimacy and affect. 261 
Specialist knowledge and ‘navigation’ were stressed by arms-length facilitators such as Alec 262 
and Travis, as well as by lawyer/facilitators Mark and Justine and lawyer/agency owner Talia. 263 
Alec was at pains to characterise his role as neither an advisor nor a facilitator in potentially 264 
unlawful commercial surrogacy arrangements; ‘really it’s not a legal service, it’s really one 265 
parent giving advice to another parent’ (Alec, information facilitator). Likewise, Travis 266 
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described himself as a ‘local communication piece’ or ‘client manager’ for a large multi-267 
national surrogacy provider. Travis explained that he is not facilitating commercial surrogacy 268 
because he ‘doesn’t sign the contracts’, adding, ‘I’m just the person that is a channel of 269 
information back and forth.’ Travis said that the value he provides is that when engaging in 270 
surrogacy abroad, ‘you’re jumping in with no parachute’: 271 
‘I felt if I can be that peace of mind for people, also chase up the other end and be that 272 
advocate…to make sure [the company] is doing what they say they’re doing and...to 273 
make sure [the clients] understand the process…’ 274 
Mark is a lawyer with a ‘project management company’ for surrogacy that offers a fixed fee 275 
‘complete package service’ in which he acts as middleman linking intended parents to 276 
overseas IVF clinics and surrogacy and egg donation agencies. Mark also has a ‘legal side’ 277 
undertaking immigration and parentage work for another fixed fee. Mark reported that his 278 
service has a ‘value add’ in representing the interests of Australian clients to overseas 279 
agencies because they are often not at arms-length from the lawyers they utilise, and also 280 
through his repeat work with the agencies in garnering better services for his clients, because 281 
otherwise an intended parent ‘on their own is just another little fish.’ 282 
Lawyer and agency owner Talia stressed the benefits of her ‘complete service’ covering both 283 
‘legal and logistical services of surrogacy abroad.’ Talia’s surrogacy agency based in Israel 284 
directly runs a surrogacy provider in Ukraine as well as a series of supply chain arrangements 285 
in other countries; the ‘organisational’ elements of surrogacy she manages include the 286 
movement of doctors, egg donors, embryos and gametes across international borders. 287 
‘I’m not a doctor, I’m not doing the IVF myself. I’m not a shipper, I’m not flying the 288 
embryos myself. But it’s choosing the right partners and struggling to protect the 289 
rights of the clients.’ 290 
In contrast, as discussed below, the six female facilitators directly negotiating reproductive 291 
relationships focused much more upon quality control and support services as their 292 
contribution. These claims were based much more squarely within the relational frame and 293 
expressed as the provision of care or as caregiving labour.  294 
Quality control 295 
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In keeping with the broader literature on medical travel facilitators, there was very little focus 296 
on formal accreditation or objective safety measures when asserting ‘quality’ (e.g. Penney et 297 
al., 2011; Snyder et al., 2011); rather it rested upon facilitators having personal knowledge of 298 
a service and the personnel there. Three facilitators volunteered that they only worked with 299 
clinicians who adhered to the voluntary professional standards for reproductive medicine in 300 
their respective country, although none appeared to have knowledge of the more stringent 301 
approach of Australian clinical guidelines concerning IVF compared to the country of 302 
treatment (Millbank, 2015b).  303 
Among the six female facilitators was a strong thread of having personally developed what 304 
they regarded as a positive working model of their service (whether surrogacy or egg 305 
donation), accompanied by close working relationships with particular clinical sites and 306 
providers. All stressed that they invested care and resources into an intensive screening and 307 
matching model which they regarded as responsible for high ‘success rates’: meaning the 308 
satisfaction of both parties in the arrangements that they brokered, over and above the 309 
completion of the arrangement without dispute. All six facilitators stressed that they sought 310 
clinicians whom they regarded as trustworthy, safe and clinically competent. For most this 311 
involved long-term reciprocal referral arrangements wherein they worked repeatedly with 312 
the same clinicians or clinics. For Paige this involved annual visits to the clinics that she worked 313 
with abroad, and a year-long process of evaluation before she would ‘take-on’ a new clinical 314 
provider.  315 
In Robyn’s words,  316 
‘There are some doctors that I don’t accept referrals from, there are just some doctors 317 
that – I don’t care, you can give me 100 clients, I don’t like that doctor, I don’t trust 318 
that doctor, I’m not working with that doctor….When you’ve been in the field long 319 
enough you pretty much know where most of the skeletons are. Whereas an 320 
international couple might not know about the skeletons so we just simply say “I’m 321 
really sorry we don’t work with your doctor. He’s got other agencies he or she can 322 
refer you to.’’’  323 
Within a web of professional and commercial relationships was a sense of personal 324 
responsibility for their supply chain (Snyder et al., 2011), in that facilitators would not work 325 
with clinical providers or other professionals who had treated their own clients or 326 
reproductive contributors badly in the past. Saffy, who runs an egg donation agency said, 327 
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‘we choose our clinics quite carefully, and we have stopped working with a doctor 328 
because we didn’t like how he treated – not even on a medical level – how he treated 329 
one of our donors. We’re quite on the ball with how we support our donors to make 330 
sure they’re completely happy…I didn’t like how he spoke to her.’   331 
Both Paige and Lisa reported that they had stopped working with clinics because the clinic 332 
had practices that were risky to both donors (hyperstimulation) and recipient women 333 
(multiple embryo transfer).   334 
Support services and relational labour 335 
Many facilitators characterised their role as ‘helping’ infertile people or as a form of helping 336 
profession; indeed, more than one described themselves a ‘kind of counsellor’. 337 
‘Usually I like to tell people that I sell – I find beautiful women around the world to 338 
help infertile couples that can’t have a baby. I’m an agent. I’m not – sometimes I act 339 
as the matchmaker, but normally couples – I follow their lead…’ (Paige, egg donor 340 
agency) 341 
 ‘I help people have babies. So, I help infertile couples to find an egg donor and then 342 
support them emotionally through the process... I’m basically helping people to find a 343 
suitable egg donor and then helping facilitate the donor’s appointments – basically 344 
being a middleman between the clinic and the couple.’ (Saffy, egg donor agency) 345 
‘I am a consultant and a lot of times I just tell people I do infertility counselling, 346 
because primarily what I’m doing on the phone all day is listening to many intended 347 
parents and their journeys and their stories and their loss, and what decision is best 348 
for them…’ (Ruth, surrogacy agency) 349 
Within these claims was a consistent claim to emotional investment, personal presence, and 350 
care. Saffy explained her role in shorthand as ‘handholding’, stressing this emotional link as a 351 
vital part of the chain between patients and clinicians: 352 
‘The clinics are obviously far too busy to sit and do handholding…that’s where we step 353 
in. We do handholding. I let people cry on my shoulder. I take phone calls at four in 354 
the morning, if somebody’s period has started and it’s not supposed to…we’re in a 355 
very, very emotional industry [and we help it] run a little bit smoother, for the benefit 356 
of everybody, including the clinics because the doctor and nurses have more than 357 
enough on their hands without somebody saying, ‘Oh I’m not going to be a good Mum’ 358 
or ‘Does the donor have curly hair – I’ve just woken up and thought it is just wavy or 359 
is it actually curly?’ Little things that play on people’s minds, when you’ve got quite a 360 
stressful choice and situation.’ 361 
The relational nature of the labour of facilitators was particularly inflected with the idioms of 362 
intimacy for the six women who directly broker arrangements between reproductive 363 
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providers and egg recipients and intended parents. In these relationships the facilitator was 364 
personally present and claimed an investment in the emotional well-being of parties that she, 365 
and her team, were responsible for. 366 
Among the six female facilitators who arranged reproductive relationships, all characterised 367 
their role as one of managing the relationship, mediating information and ‘matchmaking’. 368 
Indeed, it was notable how often the language of romance seeped into interviews. Ruth said 369 
that, ‘You always have to see surrogacy relationships as they’re no different than romantic 370 
relationships, in the sense that you have to have certain etiquette with things.’ Ruth explained 371 
for example that she would ‘gently broach’ topics if there appeared to be trouble brewing 372 
between a surrogate and intended parents but ‘it’s like your best friend going to your spouse 373 
if you’re upset with your spouse.’ Similarly, Paige described recipient couples as ‘in love’ with 374 
their donor, and the donor with them.  375 
Paige explained that she assiduously fostered the relationship between donors and recipients 376 
through a structured exchange of notes and gifts; for example, a letter of appreciation from 377 
the recipients to the donor at the time when she is injecting hormones, ‘It makes this couple 378 
real. She is no longer just giving eggs to a clinic’, and a gift basket to her when she is recovering 379 
from egg retrieval. Paige, Saffy and Robyn all mediated contact with handwritten cards and 380 
gifts as a customary part of their practice, encouraging gifts which came from the recipients’ 381 
cultural or country background and ‘made them real’ for reproductive contributors. Robyn 382 
also encouraged surrogates to take their own children shopping for a small baby present for 383 
the intended parents, in order to engage them in the relationship.  384 
Interestingly, Paige also noted that her role in mediating communication was to ‘protect’ 385 
young and self-sacrificing donors by keeping them apart from recipients.  386 
‘She’s this young innocent woman for the most part. Until she’s at least 35 and no 387 
longer donating I feel I need to keep their direct contact separate.’  388 
Paige went on to relate the story of a past donor from her service who had been approached 389 
directly by recipients (when they had seen her at the clinic abroad where they were all 390 
undergoing treatment) and persuaded to donate for them again without any payment, 391 
moreover at a cheaper and less safe clinic. In this anecdote, Paige downplayed her role as a 392 
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service provider to the clients and instead emphasised her ethical responsibility to ‘protect’ 393 
the egg donor from those who might take advantage of her.  394 
Just as they stressed their emotional investment in their work and the well-being of both their 395 
clients and the women who form their supply chain, facilitators downplayed the commercial 396 
aspects of their operations. Both Alec and Ruth went to some pains to stress that they had 397 
provided free advice to others seeking surrogacy for a considerable period of time before 398 
commercialising because, in Ruth’s words, ‘I just couldn’t manage working in a family and 399 
running it for free…’ Likewise Mali, Paige and Robyn all volunteered that they asked only a 400 
‘fair’ price for their services, and that they were not wealthy or motivated by money. 401 
 402 
The marketplace in which facilitators were operating is one in which there were few, if any, 403 
formal professional or ethical codes of practice in operation (recollecting that three stated 404 
that they abided by local peer regulation in the form of ART guidance, and noting that four 405 
facilitators had signed onto a US-based voluntary code of practice for egg donation and 406 
surrogacy services).iii Yet in international treatment even more than domestic third party 407 
reproduction, there is the potential for serious power disparities between intended parents 408 
and reproductive contributors, as well as informational disparities between intended parents 409 
and ‘repeat players’ in service provision. Particularly given that facilitators saw themselves as 410 
‘taking care’ of their reproductive contributors and patients at the same time as the patients 411 
were the paying clients, we sought to elucidate professionals’ sense of ethical codes by 412 
examining their views on conflicts of interest and client refusal. 413 
 414 
III. Ethical duties and limits 415 
In order to explore in a concrete way participant’s views about the role of regulation we 416 
asked: ‘Do you see any conflict of interest in your role? Are there any clients you have turned 417 
away, and if so, why? Are there any other providers you have concerns about?’ This allowed 418 
us to explore specific examples before turning to the more abstract question of: ‘Do you think 419 
that there should be some regulation of your industry?’ Interviewees were markedly reluctant 420 
to acknowledge that they experienced conflicts of interest in their own role, but many 421 
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expressed concerns about the sharp practice of other players, or had a ‘horror story’ to tell. 422 
Many professionals were concerned to reduce or avoid such bad practice in the future, but 423 
were cautious about whether external regulation could provide the appropriate framework 424 
to do so. 425 
Conflict of interest 426 
Conflicts of interest may arise when professionals undertake multiple roles, when 427 
professional’s engagement with other actors in arrangements is not arms-length, and when 428 
professionals are engaged with both reproductive consumers and contributors. Because of 429 
the open-ended nature of the question, respondents were able to focus upon any aspect of 430 
their role.  431 
Facilitators Robyn, Paige, Lisa and lawyer/facilitator Mark were all strongly critical of agents 432 
and lawyers having merged roles and responsibilities or not operating at arms-length, and 433 
Robyn extended this criticism to doctors in another jurisdiction:  434 
‘I don’t think that an owner of an agency should also be the attorney or the 435 
psychologist or own their own egg donation program or be a doctor. I think there 436 
needs to be a separation of professionals… Many of the cases that have gone wrong 437 
in America, when you analyse those cases it’s because there was one person that was 438 
doing several things. It’s what went wrong in India. The reason why surrogacy in India 439 
failed in my opinion is because a surrogate mum didn’t have access to a counsellor 440 
and one doctor controlled everything.’ (Robyn)  441 
In contrast, none of the professionals who themselves undertook multiple roles volunteered 442 
that this gave rise to any conflict of interest. Two lawyers who also ran facilitation agencies 443 
explained that they had done so to deal with client demand that was placing a strain upon 444 
their legal practice. 445 
According to Mark  446 
‘even though I was offering my legal services to people, people were calling upon me 447 
for a lot more, that wasn’t just related to legal advice. It was more emotional support 448 
[and practical advice]… So we then decided that, look, all this work we’re doing – 449 
because I offered my services for the entire duration, and I found it was just making 450 
no commercial sense. Because I was on tap – I never refused someone’s call…So 451 
people had me on-call and they were using it.’  452 
Likewise, Justine launched a separate entity,  453 
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‘because we had so many parents who were coming to us for legal advice and booking 454 
an hour long meeting and staying four hours. Because actually what they wanted to 455 
do was use the experience that we’ve gained from all the other clients we’ve helped 456 
about the practicalities and the risks and the costs and the different jurisdictions and 457 
how things worked and who to talk to and how to do it safely and ethically and so on. 458 
So we found that we just had this pool of practical knowledge and we needed to find 459 
a way of being able to help people.’ 460 
Three lawyers had attempted to hive off their facilitation work through setting up a distinct 461 
legal entity to undertake it – either in company form or in the name of a spouse who was also 462 
involved – thus clearly indicating an understanding that such work could be in conflict with 463 
some aspects of their obligations as a legal professional. (Similarly, facilitator Alec utilised the 464 
insider knowledge that he gained from his non-profit entity to provide specialist advice as a 465 
paid agent.) Interestingly, however, all spoke of cross-referring clients between the services 466 
and of themselves as operating across both services in a manner that was beneficial to clients 467 
because of the specialist knowledge that each ‘arm’ could bring to the other – rather than 468 
identifying this as potentially impacting upon the independence of advice.  469 
Most interviewees emphasised the importance of close working relationships between 470 
professionals in the field in terms of ensuring quality control for clients, and again did not 471 
identify this as a source of potential conflict, i.e. if the closeness of such relationships impaired 472 
the independence of their advice or that of the other professionals. For example, 473 
lawyer/facilitator Justine reported that she has been ‘very fierce’ about ‘protecting our 474 
independence and our ability to advise our clients completely dispassionately’ and so did not 475 
have ‘official arrangements’ with any particular overseas surrogacy agencies or clinics. 476 
However, she also acknowledged that there were ‘really specialist and experienced’ agencies 477 
and attorneys with whom they worked repeatedly and cross-referred. Facilitator Saffy 478 
reported a co-operative working relationship with another egg donation agency (which was 479 
in a commercial sense her biggest competitor) in that they would warn each other about 480 
unreliable donors and also cross-refer clients whose particular needs they were unable to 481 
meet. Saffy characterised this as client-centred behaviour in that she and her competitor, 482 
whose ethical standards she respected, were together ensuring that client needs were met. 483 
In a similar vein, lawyer Joan who worked providing advice to both intended parents and 484 
reproductive contributors on different matters, described herself as closely connected to a 485 
network of other lawyers who acted in surrogacy and egg donation arrangements. Joan 486 
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explained as ‘lawyer screening’ her decision not to act for certain people, within a co-487 
operative commercial network in which professional rules such as lawyer-client privilege were 488 
properly observed. In a situation in which she was acting for a party whom she believed would 489 
break the agreement (such as an egg donor who was proving unreliable) or other 490 
‘fundamental problem’, 491 
‘the lawyers that I work closely with, we have a code because we can’t disclose what 492 
the privileged conversation was. So the code is I’d call the other lawyer and say ‘I can’t 493 
continue on this matter’. Then that lawyer would say to the parents ‘you can’t have 494 
that surrogate’ or ‘you can’t have that donor. We don’t need to know why because 495 
Joan won’t do it.’’ 496 
For those whose income was drawn from particular service providers, commercial conflicts of 497 
interest were starker. For example, Alec saw his role as ‘informing consumers about best 498 
practice and making sure they’re not getting ripped off and keeping agencies honest’ but 499 
acknowledged that an income model which drew significantly upon ‘sponsorship’ from CBRC 500 
providers meant that ‘we tend to have to chuck sponsors out quite regularly because we’ve 501 
found out they’re doing something that isn’t working legally for people.’ Travis, who was paid 502 
by one particular surrogacy agency, explained that his role was ‘advocat[ing] for the client as 503 
much as possible, but I guess I’m technically working for [the company].’ This finding reflects 504 
that of Snyder et al’s study of Canadian medical travel facilitators, who described their role 505 
strongly as one of advocating for patients (‘from an ethical standpoint, my responsibility to 506 
the patient is … I really am that patient’s physician one-step removed’: 2011, 532) at the same 507 
time that they were paid primarily by service providers.  508 
The lawyers all frankly acknowledged that the bulk, or entirety, of their clientele was made 509 
up of reproductive ‘consumers’ not reproductive contributors, because they are the paying 510 
customers. As lawyer David says ‘its necessarily the case that our practice [is] reflective of the 511 
market, that most of those clients are intended parents, not surrogates.’ As long as a 512 
surrogate had her own legal advice, distinct from that provided to the intended parents, the 513 
lawyers interviewed were content that there was no conflict. Only one medical professional 514 
volunteered a sense of conflict in that he was making decisions for intended parents that were 515 
not necessarily in the best interests of the surrogate, noting that the high rate of caesarean 516 
births in surrogacy could be seen as an unnecessary operation for the surrogate and  517 
represented a ‘compromise with morality sometimes’ (George, doctor). 518 
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In contrast, those involved directly in brokering and matching services acknowledged the 519 
division of loyalties that arose when working with reproductive consumers and contributors. 520 
To varying degrees, all six female facilitators argued that although the intended parents or 521 
recipient woman was their client, they did not overlook the interests of the surrogate or egg 522 
donor. Indeed some argued that they went out of their way to ‘protect’ the women who are 523 
reproductive contributors:   524 
‘The intended parents are my only client, because they sign a contract with me. But I 525 
am the protector of my surrogate mums. … So my job is to be as fair between both 526 
parties as I possibly can, otherwise I’m going out of business.’ (Robyn) 527 
Robyn also said that she when she recruited the surrogates she had made a ‘verbal promise’ 528 
about levels of reimbursement of costs and payment, and so felt obligated to fulfil that 529 
promise, even though the actual contract was made between the intended parents and 530 
surrogate and she was not herself party to the contract.  531 
Paige argued that that her primary responsibility is to the donors: 532 
‘first and foremost my responsibility is for – as a company – is to the donor. We’re 533 
absolutely not going to jeopardise the health or safety or wellbeing of a young woman 534 
for the fertility of someone else…Most of our couples understand that. They 535 
understand that they’re second in this whole procedure.’ 536 
Paige, Robyn, Saffy, Lisa and Ruth all provided strong support services to surrogates and 537 
donors; they had separate and specialised personnel for dealing with intended parents and 538 
recipients, with clearly delineated roles for counsellors and support workers. Paige noted that 539 
it is very important for a donor to have ‘her own advocate’, and for intended parents too, so 540 
there is ‘not the same person trying to juggle both of them.’ It was common for donor support 541 
workers and surrogate support workers in these agencies to be former donors/surrogates 542 
themselves. For example, Ruth’s five surrogate support workers were all former surrogates 543 
because she regarded it as vital for surrogates to speak to someone ‘who has been through it 544 
and understands.’ She noted that, ‘It’s very hard for a surrogate to get all of her support from 545 
the intended parents. I think it’s essential that they have peer support…’ 546 
While reproductive consumers are clients, the success and reputation of the agency with 547 
those who are reproductive providers was a very significant part of the working model of the 548 
industry. All of those involved in brokering reproductive arrangements, whether in surrogacy 549 
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or egg donation, utilised a word of mouth chain recruitment system in which former egg 550 
donors or surrogates sent them new contributors. As Robyn put it, the parents are her clients, 551 
‘but without surrogate mums I don’t exist in this world’. The value of the reputational capital 552 
(Krawiec, 2009, 236) that brokers amassed not just among clientele but throughout their 553 
network of reproductive contributors, should not be underestimated. I suggest that this 554 
capital was jealously guarded by those who held it, and that a number of interviewees saw it 555 
as acting as an important form of quality control in the market.  556 
Client refusal 557 
More than one interviewee frankly acknowledged that they had never turned away a client; 558 
however, this was said to be because their referral system had already filtered out 559 
problematic clients, and all interviewees reported that they would deny service in certain 560 
circumstances. There were very few articulated or ‘hard and fast rules’ about exclusion of 561 
clients, it was more a question of what didn’t ‘feel right’ (facilitator Paige). 562 
Most facilitators and some lawyers required as a condition of their services that clients 563 
undertake a criminal record check, or a personal reference check if this was not possible 564 
because of the country of origin of the parents. Two reported that they had refused to work 565 
with a client who disclosed criminal convictions for child pornography or sexual violence, 566 
while one noted that he had accepted a client with a criminal record for another form of 567 
criminal offence that he did not regard as ‘incompatible with good parenting.’ Two agents 568 
and one lawyer acknowledged that the background checking for intended parents was far less 569 
rigorous than that undertaken on surrogates. 570 
Interviewees from all professional groups reported declining a client couple where the 571 
relationship between the intended parent couple was ‘rocky’ or appeared to be a sham. For 572 
the medical professionals and facilitators this was because they did not believe that the 573 
couple would successfully complete the surrogacy arrangement; for the legal professional it 574 
gave rise to a professional conflict as he was acting for both parties in the couple and believed 575 
that their interests were in conflict.  576 
No one reported that they declined service to same-sex couples; although some reported that 577 
they undertook extra investigation when the client for surrogacy was a single man. 578 
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A few doctors and facilitators said that they were not ‘comfortable with’ or refused to act for 579 
‘older’ clients, even if there was no age limit in the relevant jurisdiction relating to the 580 
provision of IVF. For Alec this meant those over 50; for Talia it was over 60.  Alec was also not 581 
‘comfortable’ with surrogacy for those who already had children but were seeking more, 582 
giving the example of those with age related infertility in second marriages seeking more 583 
children: ‘Well look, so there’s a sense among many of us that you should prioritise surrogacy 584 
for people who are childless.’ Conversely, Paige reported ‘ignoring’ requests from a gay male 585 
couple seeking surrogacy whom she regarded as too young (under 25). 586 
Two facilitators and one lawyer reported refusing clients whom they believed had 587 
approached surrogacy in an overtly commodifying manner (such as seeking multiple 588 
simultaneous surrogates, suggesting that they would choose ‘the best’ baby, or offering to 589 
buy babies for adoption). 590 
Several interviewees stressed that it was not for them to ‘make value judgments’ (facilitator 591 
Alec), ‘impart my personal belief system upon the clients’ (lawyer Nigel) or ‘to decide who 592 
can have a child and who cannot have a child’ (Lucas, doctor). This prevailing view was that it 593 
was for clients themselves to judge their own suitability to parent and that professionals were 594 
neither equipped nor inclined to do so.  595 
However, there was a minority who saw themselves as ‘gate-keepers’. Paige acknowledged 596 
that, ‘I am the one that judges if they are going to be good parents or not, because that is 597 
what I am looking for.’ Four interviewees stressed that they would only accept clients who 598 
agree to what they regard as an ethical or workable model for surrogacy or egg donation. For 599 
those facilitators, their commitment to their model of ‘successful’ or ‘good’ practice required 600 
a commitment to relationality in the process; that is for intended parents to be willing to form 601 
a relationship with the surrogate before and during the pregnancy and/or for egg donors to 602 
be identifiable at a later point to donor conceived children. This was not so much a judgment 603 
on parental suitability as it was a commitment to what they believed was a successful model 604 
of practice in their field. 605 
Taken together, it appeared that the interviewees largely saw their mission as assisting the 606 
alleviation of infertility (defined as both medical and social infertility inclusive of gay men), 607 
working from a presumption of fitness of intended parents that could be rebutted by clear 608 
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evidence of past harm to children or by strong indications of current relationship, or 609 
emotional, instability. Within that frame, eligibility requirements or background checks for 610 
intended parents were limited, and client refusal was uncommon. As will be seen below, 611 
interviewees were generally more concerned about the unethical practice of other market 612 
players than they were about the suitability of their clients.  613 
Unethical providers 614 
All of the facilitators, and many of the lawyers, acknowledged that the unregulated nature of 615 
cross border reproduction meant that unqualified and unethical players were rife.  Alec noted, 616 
‘It is the wild west in surrogacy still… Any Joe Blow can open up a surrogacy agency…’.  617 
Several interviewees reported that their clients had paid thousands of dollars to other 618 
agencies or facilitators who had then shut up shop and disappeared. As lawyer David put it 619 
there are ‘plenty of sharks in the water.’ Lawyer/facilitator Mark said, ‘if you’re looking for 620 
crooks, this is the industry to find them in. There are so many people out there who are out 621 
to make a quick buck.’ 622 
Alec, Mark, Talia and Bob were all strongly critical of agencies which ‘sold’ clients into 623 
countries where they did not actually have staff on the ground. Alec characterised these 624 
agencies as ‘outsourcing’ the crucial elements of recruitment and ‘just taking a cut at the 625 
start.’ Mark volunteered as one ‘shocker’ a person  626 
‘with about 20 different domain names …and he basically is a channel to different 627 
agencies. So he just like takes commission and passes you onto someone but doesn’t 628 
– you never hear from him or see him again…you have people who are setting up their 629 
little business from home, and saying, ‘hey we can be a surrogacy agency’. All they 630 
really are is really an introduction agency to another agency.’ 631 
When serious problems arose, such as regulatory shutdowns in India or Thailand, or natural 632 
disasters such as in Nepal, arms-length agencies who were not located within the relevant 633 
country were seen as more likely to cut and run: for example, Alec named one agency who, 634 
‘once Thailand closed down they said oh well you’re on your own now everybody, you can 635 
get babies out on your own.’  636 
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Several interviewees, particularly lawyers such as Frank, Joan, Mark, and Talia, were very 637 
critical of both facilitators and lawyers who ‘set up shop’ with little or no experience. Frank 638 
reported, 639 
‘operators around town who jumped on the surrogacy bandwagon and they include 640 
medium to large sized law firms who obviously have the marketing budget to get their 641 
name out there, but I just think their clients are probably getting an inferior service 642 
and inferior advice.’ 643 
Talia noted that in Ukraine there were women who ‘today she opened an agency because 644 
yesterday she was a donor and she thinks she knows what to do.’ In Bob’s words, ‘anybody 645 
can call themselves an agency.’ Bob expressed concern that former parents through surrogacy 646 
and former surrogates, who set up agencies when they lack legal background or social work 647 
skills, don’t understand the law and don’t do proper screening. In contrast, facilitator Saffy 648 
stressed that her faith that ‘we’re all on the same ethical road’ in her field was precisely 649 
because in her jurisdiction,  650 
‘Most of the agencies have been started by women who have either undergone the 651 
IVF process themselves, or been egg donors. So we’ve all had experience in the field…’ 652 
Examples of specific conduct which interviewees regarded as unethical practice by other 653 
agencies or providers included: Utilising surrogates who have not yet had their own children; 654 
not carefully matching surrogate’s and intended parent’s views on pregnancy termination; 655 
not requiring intended parents to be present at the birth (and not informing the surrogate 656 
that they intended to be absent); advertising for egg donors in ‘low income’ areas; paying egg 657 
donors excessive sums; utilising the same egg donors more than a certain number of times; 658 
performing multiple embryo transfers (more than two at a time); not ensuring that intended 659 
parents and children are genetically related before issuing documentation relied upon for 660 
legal parentage; and not refunding payment to egg recipients when an egg donor withdrew 661 
from donation.  662 
Overwhelmingly, participants understood their own ethical duty to be limited to service 663 
denial; only two professionals, both lawyers, referred to a situation where they had 664 
‘blacklisted’ a provider or taken other active steps such as alerting other professionals to a 665 
situation which they regarded as improper. In general, the approach was very much one of 666 
‘live and let live’, in which undesirable clients or unethical providers were quietly withdrawn 667 
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from (or indeed in the case of one medical professional, referred to each other when he did 668 
not wish to engage with them) but not confronted; the market was trusted to ‘find its own 669 
level’. Saffy noted that in her view agencies ‘who don’t run ethically don’t last long, because 670 
the clinics won’t refer people to them.’ 671 
Interestingly, Alec and Talia turned the question to the conduct of the local Australian fertility 672 
industry, rather than CBRC providers. In Alec’s view, ‘profit driven’ Australian fertility clinics 673 
behave unethically when undertaking multiple unsuccessful IVF cycles for couples who have 674 
very low likelihood of success, without suggesting egg donation or surrogacy. He argued that 675 
such treatment was ‘medically negligent’. Talia regarded it as unethical and a human rights 676 
breach for Australian clinics to refuse to transfer patients’ own gametes or embryos out of 677 
their service and/or out of the country (in circumstances where the likely use was commercial 678 
surrogacy).  679 
Regulation 680 
‘Australians make a mistake often, we think that if there’s an agency that has 681 
something to do with health, fitness, it must have a licence from the government. 682 
That’s how we operate… But the reality of the surrogacy agencies in the US and 683 
Canada is that they don’t, they simply don’t.’ (Alec) 684 
Very few of the participants supported any form of external regulation of their industry. 685 
Within the facilitator group however, four suggested that peer regulation and industry norms 686 
should be articulated to establish and promote accepted minimum standards of conduct 687 
(reflecting the findings of Snyder et al’s study of Canadian medical travel facilitators, some of 688 
whom also expressed the desire for increased regulation).  689 
Ruth, Lisa, Robyn and Paige all expressed the view that regulation should reflect existing best 690 
practice standards; which they saw as very much their own model of practice based on many 691 
years of experience. In Robyn’s words, ‘So if you did surrogacy correctly then the law would 692 
not need to react to it, it would follow the rules which have been set [in the industry]’.  One 693 
facilitator had been involved in setting up a peer accreditation process for providers in her 694 
field. In her view an overt commitment to minimum ethical standards meant a smoother 695 
industry and less likelihood of regulation being externally imposed. Four facilitators had 696 
already joined a voluntary US-based industry code for surrogacy and egg donation, although 697 
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two reported the view that it had been insufficiently adhered to by other members and one 698 
reported that it ‘lacked teeth’ in terms of sanctions for non-compliance. 699 
A number of professionals working within ostensibly altruistic systems (Australia, the UK and 700 
Canada) such as Frank, David, Ruth and Justine, argued that removing legal restrictions on 701 
commercial surrogacy would ultimately enable a more ethical and regulated field. Justine for 702 
example repeatedly emphasised the extent of ‘unhealthy’ and ‘underground’ practice: 703 
‘Our frustration is that surrogates in [this jurisdiction] are compensated, and they’re 704 
not compensated much less than surrogates in the USA, so it is so unhealthy for people 705 
because parents who are honest are anxious throughout the whole process.’ 706 
In addition, Justine was very concerned about the growth in people within her jurisdiction 707 
matching in surrogacy arrangements unscreened through Facebook and other sites, ‘People 708 
are using these unregulated online ways of matching, the stuff we see is terrifying in terms of 709 
the lack of information, and misinformation…’ 710 
Ruth expressed concern that agents and parents were routinely breaking the law on issues 711 
such as expenses and that continued bans on commercial surrogacy impeded the opportunity 712 
for overt and specialised regulation of professionals, whom she believed should be licensed 713 
and subject to annual renewal of license. Frank argued that there should be specialist 714 
accreditation in reproduction law, akin to family law accreditation, to prevent incompetence 715 
and over-charging in the field. 716 
Conclusion 717 
This research sought to understand the role that facilitators and providers play in the travel 718 
of Australians abroad for assisted reproductive treatment. The conduct of facilitators and 719 
service providers was understood as a form of professional practice, based within a web of 720 
tightly held relationships and enacted as a form of relational labour. A small number of closely 721 
held and inter-linked entities in the largely unregulated CBRC field, with key personnel 722 
occupying multiple roles in some cases, poses the prospect of commercial and professional 723 
conflicts of interest, both real and perceived. We sought to examine how facilitators 724 
understood ethical limits within their industry and their own conduct by probing how they 725 
characterised the ‘value add’ of their role, what they understood to be conflicts of interest in 726 
25 
 
that role, their views on unethical or unscrupulous players and practices and their own 727 
standards on denial of service.  728 
Inhorn and Gurtin note that,  729 
The specifics of CBRC organization, particularly as they pertain to ‘hub’ destinations 730 
and clinics, are essential in assessing the relevance of ethical and practical concerns 731 
raised by critical commentaries on CBRC, for developing adequate guidelines for 732 
professionals and patients and for directing policy strategies at the national and 733 
international level. 734 
… only by considering the mounting empirical evidence from a broad variety of global 735 
sites will professional organizations and regulatory bodies be able to set appropriate 736 
ethical guidelines and formulate effective policy. (2011, 668, 674). 737 
This study found that informal practice-based norms dominate current understandings of 738 
ethical conduct in the facilitation and provision of cross border assisted reproductive services. 739 
When such norms were articulated, there was a degree of consensus among the participants, 740 
and particularly among the facilitator group, about minimum standards of practice within a 741 
broadly laissez faire context in which their role was to ‘help people have children’. Broadly 742 
agreed standards included: minimalist eligibility standards for intended parents (indicated 743 
need for surrogacy, criminal record checks, relationship stability if in a relationship, but 744 
notably no other marital status requirement); rather more stringent eligibility standards for 745 
surrogates (including criminal record checks, relationship stability and support system, the 746 
birth of her own children and absence of financial need as a primary motivation); some form 747 
of separate representation of the parties in surrogacy and egg donation (both through 748 
independent lawyers and separate counsellors or support workers); ensuring that the clinical 749 
treatment of reproductive contributors and egg recipients was ‘safe’; and matching protocols 750 
that aimed to fit the needs and expectations of contributors and recipients.  751 
While participants were in general wary of external regulation, particularly in the form of 752 
legislation, not all were opposed to the prospect of some form of increased regulation, such 753 
as an increased role for peer regulation and guidance. Further engagement with facilitators 754 
and service providers of CBRC arguably presents a valuable source of expertise from which 755 
national and cross-border responsive regulatory frameworks could be informed in the future. 756 
Such hands-on experience could be well utilised if placed within a broader evidence-based 757 
framework, including the evolving social science research on outcomes for children in 758 
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surrogacy and donor conception (Blake et al., 2014; Jadva et al., 2012; Ilioi et al., 2015), egg 759 
donor experiences (Almeling, 2011, 2014) and information needs and expectations of parties 760 
in donor conception (Zadeh et al., 2018; Persaud et al., 2017). 761 
While many forms of national regulation are arguably moot in the face of such dynamic 762 
internationalised practices, I suggest that domestic regulators and agencies focused on 763 
patient safety should consider first steps towards distilling and promulgating best practice, 764 
such as accreditation of CBRC agencies or providers based on demonstrated minimum 765 
standards, such that both patients and reproductive contributors can be better informed 766 
about substandard operators and so that currently implicit industry norms and practices are 767 
made explicit and transparent. Measures such as minimum standards would consolidate good 768 
practice, allow the input of experienced professionals, and could be adapted and scaffolded 769 
into later responsive regulatory measures, including through reforms to Australian surrogacy 770 
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